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Abstract
High Dynamic Range (HDR) images represent the future format for digital images since they allow to
accurately render a wider range of luminance values. However, nowadays special types of pre-processing
collectively known as tone-mapping (TM) operators are needed to adapt HDR images to currently existing
displays. Tone-mapped images, although of reduced dynamic range, have nonetheless high quality and
hence retain some commercial value. In this paper we propose a solution to the problem of HDR
image watermarking, e.g., for copyright embedding, that should survive tone-mapping. Therefore, the
requirements imposed on the watermark encompass imperceptibility, a certain degree of security and
robustness to tone-mapping operators. The proposed watermarking system belongs to the blind, detectable
category, it is based on the QIM paradigm and employs a higher order statistics as feature. Experimental
analysis shows positive results and demonstrates the system effectiveness with current state-of-art TM
algorithms.
EDICS: WAT-BINM, WAT-OTHA
I. INTRODUCTION
High Dynamic Range (HDR) images represent the radiance of scenes captured by a device or generated
by an artificial rendering system. Due to the wide dynamics of visible luminance, their pixels usually take
floating point values and thus HDR images cannot be directly rendered by present-day displays. In fact,
the original values must be adapted in order to fit the dynamic and color gamut of the target device. This
adaptation, which transforms a “scene referred” image into an “output referred” one, can be obtained by
applying a so called tone-mapping (TM) process. Tone-mapping techniques are all non-linear in nature
and could vary depending on the algorithm: their complexity can range from something as simple as
some kind of global transformation (e.g. clipping followed by histogram equalization) to more complex
non-linear local processing.
Tone-mapped images keep some commercial and intellectual value because of their high visual quality
despite their limited dynamic range and hence they are possible targets for misappropriation or misuse by
malevolent entities. This is an unavoidable problem which will have to be faced as soon as HDR images
and their tone-mapped versions reach widespread diffusion - and they certainly will in the near future.
2A possible solution is represented by data hiding techniques, such as digital watermarking [1] [2], which
try to embed into any given HDR image some kind of information that should have to stay therein even
after a tone-mapping processing. To the authors’ knowledge, no major work concerning the problem of
HDR image watermarking robust to tone-mapping has been widely studied yet.
In this paper, we therefore propose to embed a watermark to enforce or simply communicate property
rights of a given HDR image to any potential user. The watermark needs only to survive to those
processing that preserve perceptual value, as in the case of TM operators, while as soon as the tone-
mapped image loses its high quality, due to some other kind of manipulation, its commercial value
is greatly diminished and therefore watermark loss could be afforded. This obviously implies that the
watermark must be highly imperceptible. Depending on the application framework, the watermarking
system could be either blind or non-blind, according to the availability of the original image during
the watermark recovery; here we conduct a preliminary analysis by embedding a detectable (i.e. only
the watermark presence must be assessed, but the watermark by itself bears no information), blindly
recoverable, imperceptible watermark robust to non-linear value-metric attacks, using an improved version
of the algorithm presented in [3]. The latter was originally proposed for 8 bpp grayscale images; however
its structure and the particular nature of the problem at hand makes it suitable for its adaptation to the
HDRI context too.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II, the system framework is proposed;
in particular, the description of several overall design considerations constitutes the focus of this Section.
In Section III a thorough, step-by-step description of the watermarking system is reported, highlighting
how it fulfills the requirements in the HDR context. Then, Section IV shows some experimental results
for a varied set of HDR images, both in terms of detection performances and imperceptibility. Finally,
Section V draws some conclusive remarks.
II. SYSTEM FRAMEWORK
For watermarking purposes, it is reasonable to work in the luminance domain since tone-mapping is likely
to strongly tamper with the chrominance components in an unpredictable way (e.g., not monotonically).
Therefore, the first step of our system must be luminance component extraction from the HDR image.
It will carry the watermark, while chrominance components will be left untouched. This consideration is
also compatible with the pre-existent LDR image watermarking system; for the sake of this Section, let
us assume that we have at our disposal a reliable watermarking system, imperceptible and robust to both
linear and non-linear pixel value-metric attacks, to use as a block box. The discussion on the watermarking
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Figure 1: Sketch of HDR watermarking possible methods.
system is postponed to Section III. Figure 1 schematically shows how the watermarking system could be
conceived. The most straightforward approach, depicted in Figure 1a, would be to watermark directly the
HDR original image IHDR, assuming the watermarking algorithm could be somehow ported in the HDR
domain, and then hope that the watermark embedded in the resulting IHDRW survives any subsequent
TM process, denoted by TM i. However, estimating the perceptual impact that the watermark is going to
produce on the tone-mapped versions of the image is very difficult. Conservative approaches would surely
imply that the watermark would not survive the TM process. Moreover, the watermarking algorithm may
not be ported in the HDR domain without losing its nice robustness properties.
The solution adopted here is instead illustrated by Figure 1b. In [4] the LogLuv color space is shown;
the log transform applied to the luminance guarantees that distortions of the same magnitude on different
starting log-luminance values will be perceived approximately in the same way. In fact, in [5] it is argued
that any generic tone-mapping method will replicate the Weber Fechner law which makes a luminance
log transform an essential component of a TM process. Therefore, the transformation RGB-to-LogL,
abbreviated in Figure 1b by L, leads to a reasonable domain in which to perform robust watermark
embedding. Since the inverse log transform (or L−1) is readily available, it allows to obtain back in a
simple way the HDR watermarked image.
Hence, our proposed system works as follows. Initially, the original HDR image IHDR is transformed to
a reference image ILL by applying RGB-to-LogL transformation as described in [4]. The log-luminance
values range is set to [0, 255] as for 8 bpp LDR images. Then, the algorithm embeds the watermark
in ILL, obtaining ILLW . Lastly, the reverse log transform is applied obtaining the watermarked version
4of the given original HDR image. When a generic tone-mapping TM i is applied to the watermarked
HDR image IHDRW , the watermark is still present as long as the assumption of similarity between
the log transform and tone-mapping operators in the luminance component holds, that is it is assumed
that ITM iW can be obtained from ILLW through a mild non-linear transformation against which the
watermarking process is robust. The effectiveness of this approach will be demonstrated in Section IV.
III. WATERMARKING SYSTEM
Digital watermarking systems comprise several possible frameworks. In particular, still image water-
marking is a huge field, with a plethora of solutions proposed for a variety of different applications.
The selection of the particular technique needed in a watermarking system is strongly dependent on its
requirements, which in turn depend on the intended application. The main requirements of a watermarking
system are robustness, security, capacity and imperceptibility. Robustness is the ability of the watermark
to resist to non-malicious content manipulations, such as compression, editing, etc. Such manipulations
are likely to occur during the normal lifetime of the watermarked object. On the other hand, security
is concerned with intelligent attackers interested in removing or disabling the watermark by exploiting
possible weaknesses in the watermarking system; in particular, an attacker could also take advantage of
poor robustness against a particular transformation. Security usually requires that the system relies on
some secret key shared between the embedder and the recovery entities as seen in private cryptography.
Capacity refers to the quantity of information conveyed by the watermark itself; when this quantity
is only 1 bit, that is to say we are only interested in assessing whether the watermark is present in
a given image, the watermark is called detectable, otherwise it is called decodable or multi-bit. Last,
imperceptibility refers to the obvious fact that the watermark embedding should not alter the perceptual
quality of the original content. Another important classification in watermarking is between the blind
and the non-blind watermark recovery, in which the latter process needs the original (unwatermarked)
data to be performed whereas the former does not. All these requirements, plus a number of marginal
others such as computational complexity of either the embedder or the recovery block or both, blend in
different ways to form a watermarking system suitable for an application at hand.
The watermarking technique that is at the core of the proposed HDR image watermarking is explained
in [6] and [3]. To summarize, the system proposed in this work is based on the QIM paradigm [7] and
is designed to embed a blindly detectable one bit watermark in HDR images. The watermark must be
specifically robust against TM operators (as well as against some other common image processing) that
are thoroughly described in Section IV. Watermark security is guaranteed by a number of randomization
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steps in the embedding process. Last, high-quality imperceptibility is an imperative requirement, pursued
by employing a powerful perceptual mask during the watermark embedding process.
This Section first points out in Subsection III-A the requirements we have imposed on the HDR image
watermarking system proposed in this work. Then, the system structure we have implemented to achieve
them is described in the following Subsections. The feature selected as the watermark medium is the
kurtosis of the approximation subband wavelet coefficients extracted in N blocks, and bit repetition coding
is employed by embedding the same bit in every block. The feature extraction process is described in
Subsection III-B. The perceptual mask necessary to guarantee that the imperceptibility requirement is
met is illustrated in Subsection III-C. Finally, the watermark embedding and the recovery procedures are
explained in Subsection III-D. The watermark embedder and detector respective flowcharts are shown in
Figures 2 and 3; they are described in turn in what follows.
A. Watermarking Requirements
In our case, the main requirement which is imposed on the detectable watermarking system is imper-
ceptibility, since there is strong interest in retaining the high perceptual quality of the original HDR
image. The other important requirement is robustness against any TM operator which could be applied
to the original HDR image. This means that after the watermark has been embedded in the original HDR
image, all of its tone-mapped versions should also contain the watermark, regardless of the particular TM
6algorithm used as long as the quality has been preserved to a sufficient extent. As already mentioned,
there exist several tone-mapping algorithms, so that tailoring the approach to every one is impracticable.
However, it can be easily assumed that all tone-mapped versions of a given HDR image are perceptually
similar. In fact, in [5] it is argued that all tone-mapping operators could be described by a single model
with an appropriate fitting of some model parameters.
All tone-mapped versions of a given HDR image can be derived one from the other by means of a global
linear transformation (e.g., a brightness adjustment) followed by some mild non-linear transformation.
So, the original requirement of robustness against TM operators translates into robustness against this
mix of linear and mild non-linear transformations. If this condition is verified we will show that when a
particular TM image has been watermarked, the other TM versions will also contain the watermark. The
watermarking system proposed in [6] is robust against pixel value-metric non-linear attacks. It is also
invariant against linear value-metric scaling and thus it is well suited for the problem at hand. However,
it needs some adjustments since it was originally proposed for LDR image watermarking. We choose to
embed a detectable watermark, which means that its capacity is single bit. Security can be achieved by
suitable randomization of the embedding algorithm steps (see K in Figures 2 and 3) thanks to the use of
a secret key. Imperceptibility it is also a concern for the LDR domain; even if imperceptible changes on
the TM images are likely to introduce significant distortion in the HDR domain because of the reverse
log, this fact can be ignored by recognizing that TM operators will mimic the response of the HVS to
real light stimulus, the same that is contained in a HDR image. Thus, when a HDR image is rendered on
a normal display, the tone mapping reduces contrast in the same way the HVS would normalize the input
stimulus. On a lower dynamic range display, the effect would be even stronger so that the watermark
induced distortion in the HDR domain can be masked provided that imperceptibility in the LDR domain
is achieved.
B. Feature Extraction
This Subsection explains the feature extraction process, which is a necessary step for both the watermark
embedder and the detector. The input of the embedder is assumed to be the reference log-luminance image
I . The first step of the feature extraction process is to apply a wavelet transform on the host image I . We
use the orthogonal, 2-level Daubechies DWT, with 8 tap filter impulse responce. This DWT, aside from
guaranteeing perfect reconstruction, has the additional advantage of providing a sparser representation,
given by the high number of vanishing moments on the analysis filters, which in turn has benefits in the
embedding process (see below).
7Robustness and imperceptibility are by their nature conflicting requirements and a suitable tradeoff has
to be reached in the watermarking system design. This tradeoff is evident even in the feature domain
selection. In our case, the feature is extracted from the approximation subband, abbreviated with AS
in Figure 2. It represent the actual watermark domain. The 6 detail subbands, at all levels, are left
untouched and are collectively indicated by DS. Any small change, including watermark embedding,
applied to the deep-level detail subbands (the “high-frequency” part of the wavelet decomposition, that
in our case are the LLHL, LLLH, and LLHH subbands), may be imperceptible; however, these subbands
have poor robustness properties since their content is easily destroyed by the TM transformations with
virtually no visual implication. On the other hand, the AS of a 2-level wavelet decomposition is a low-
pass filtered version of the host image, therefore there is more correlation between the AS coefficients
than in the pixels of the original image so that robustness is inherently higher in this subband. Using
more decomposition levels increases the coefficients correlation and thus their robustness; however, this
has also detrimental effects on the block size and their number (which affects the the block selection
process). We observed that using 2 levels of decomposition is a good tradeoff between AS subband
robustness properties and block parameters selection. The AS accounts for the most perceptible part
of the image data, hence achieving imperceptibility using this subband as the watermark domain is
challenging; however, to obtain the desired level of robustness it is mandatory to embed the watermark
in the AS domain. Imperceptibility must therefore be granted by adopting a complex perceptual mask
(see Subsection III-C) and by carefully tuning the system parameters.
Now, a N -length feature vector k is to be obtained by evaluating the kurtosis of the AS coefficients
contained in N blocks; let us defer the description of the blocks selection process and first discuss about
the properties of the kurtosis feature. Let xi, 1 ≤ i ≤ N be the coefficients vectors (the scan order is
without particular significance) forming a block.
The sample kurtosis of an input coefficient vector of length L (indicating its j-th component as x(j)i ),
with sample mean xi is defined as:
k(xi) =
L ·∑Lj=1 (x(j)i − xi)4(∑L
j=1
(
x
(j)
i − xi
)2)2 (1)
which is a biased estimator of the statistical kurtosis β2 of a probability density function (pdf), defined
as:
β2 =
µ4
σ4
=
µ4
µ22
(2)
8where, µ represent the pdf mean, µi = E[(X−µ)i] represents the i-th order central statistical moment and
σ is the standard deviation. Therefore, the kurtosis β2 is the fourth-order, central, normalized statistical
moment. In informal terms, the kurtosis measures the “peakedness” of the distribution around its mean
and how much the pdf tails are “fat”. For instance, normal pdfs have β2 = 3, uniform distributions have
β2 = 1.8, Laplacian distributions have β2 = 6 and p-Bernoulli distributions have β2 = 1p +
1
1−p − 3 (for
p = 0.5 we have the unique minimum for the kurtosis, β2 = 1 and so β2 ≥ 1). The precision of the chosen
k is adequate, since we are not trying to infer any underlying statistical property of the coefficients in xi
but we are instead interested in affirming that the feature is somewhat tied to the local perceptual content
of the image, since it describes to some extent the shape of the local wavelet coefficients distribution in
a compact way.
The sample kurtosis k(x) of a vector x is invariant to affine transformations of the kind px+ q (where
both product and sum are component-wise), that is k(x) = k(px+ q), ∀ p, q ∈ <; the proof is immediate
from inspection of Equation 1. So, the kurtosis feature is invariant to any CGA (constant gain attacks)
applied to the image, since they are linearly propagated to the AS coefficients by the wavelet filters. In
addition, experiments showed the robustness of the kurtosis feature; in particular, the relative variation
experienced by this feature after the image from which it was extracted has been attacked is with high
probability in the order of 10% of the original feature value.
Once we have defined the feature, we discuss the blocks extraction process. The block size is a key
factor for the robustness properties of the kurtosis feature. Blocks that are too small fail to capture
any perceptual content because of their excessive localization; moreover, and even more importantly,
robustness is seriously harmed by evaluating the feature on small blocks given how easy it is to radically
change the sample distribution with even minimum value changes. On the other hand, large blocks,
being too global, lose their information uniqueness, that is they tend to contain the same information
as the area of the image involved is greater. Furthermore, the complex watermark embedding procedure
(Section III-D) is very sensitive to the number of coefficients involved; in particular, we will discuss
further ahead on how the probability of not being able to correctly embed the watermark increases
with the number of coefficients in the block. These are due to the possible non-convergence of the
embedding algorithm and will be discussed in Subsection III-D. Note that the starting distribution of the
AS coefficients is important in this respect too: a certain degree of sparsity in the initial pdf is advisable
for the algorithm to converge. The complexity of the embedding algorithm, which in turn depends on
the highly non-linear behavior of the kurtosis feature, also dictates that the blocks must be strictly non-
overlapping. This fact puts an upper bound on the number of blocks N , but it has to be noted that the
9perceptual mask would also have limited N .
The block shape has its importance too. If the block boundary is represented by straight lines as
in square blocks, blocking artifacts are likely to appear (note that vertical and horizontal gradients are
particularly perceptible for a human observer). Finally, some kind of randomization in the blocks selection
is advisable for security concerns.
For all these reasons, the procedure for the N blocks selection on the AS subband is as follows; all
random steps are driven by the secret key K. Assuming for simplicity of notation that the AS subband is
square, first a uniform, m×m square cells grid is constructed. Each basic square cell side has dimension
D, that drives the actual block size, so it has to be selected carefully. The cell boundaries are then
randomized, using a low-pass filtered, zero-mean pseudo-random sequence to represent their deviation
from the standard square cell border. This way, each cell has a generally square but with random boundary
shape. The outer cells are discarded and then the whole grid of M = (m−2)×(m−2) remaining cells is
randomly shifted both horizontally and vertically by at most D/2. Last, N out of M cells are randomly
selected as the embedding blocks, provided that they satisfy a certain minimum area criterion, expressed
by the fact that the number of coefficients in any given cell must be greater than ρD2, where ρ is a
design parameter fixed at 0.9 in this work. Although the blocks are not completely random, using this
extraction procedure still achieves a high degree of security (given by the random shaping, shifting and
selection) while guaranteeing both that wavelet coefficients spatial redundancy is adequately exploited
and a sufficient number of non-overlapping blocks can be selected.
The number of blocks N is an important factor to determine both watermark imperceptibility and
detection performances. It is obtained as follows:
N = bβ ·Mc (3)
where β is a design parameter controlling the coverage by the blocks of the AS subband. Given the
above area constraint on the blocks, there exists a maximum value βmax beyond which it is impossible
to obtain the requested number of blocks satisfying said criterion. The value of βmax depends on both
the host image and the secret key, and is usually in the range [0.6, 0.7].
In this work, we have found that using ρ = 0.85, D = 6 and letting β vary in the range [0.4, 0.65]
for the extraction of the blocks on the AS subband of a 2-level decomposition provides a good tradeoff
between all the requirements expressed above.
The output of the blocks selection process is therefore a structured set of blocks, indicated by BK,
which does not constitute a matrix because the blocks have different size and is formed by the position
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Figure 25: Blocks extraction process schematic.
Hence, the blocks information BK, which stores the AS coefficients
belonging to every block, is necessarily an N-elements array of arrays,
the i-th of which is the vector xi which contains the coefficients cov-
ered by the i-th block, whose length is different for each i. Figure 25
depicts schematically the steps involved in the extraction of N = 20
blocks of size D = 6 on a 133×133 approximation coefficients subband,
obtained by wavelet decomposition using l = 2 levels of an image of
our database (recall they are all 512× 512 pixels). Every cells’ border of
the uniform grid, that is rarefied in the figure for clarity, is transformed
into a pseudo-random sequence, which is then low-pass filtered (using
a L-length FIR filter) and quantized to obtain the new, oscillating bor-
der. N blocks respecting the area constrain and not belonging to the
outer ring are finally selected at random.
6.3 feature robustness evaluation
To prove the robustness of our feature and to properly tune the pa-
rameters participating in the blocks extraction process, aside from the
heuristic considerations presented so far, we have to resort to experi-
mental tests. The parameters involved are D, the uniform cell dimen-
sion driving the size of the random blocks, and the level l of the
wavelet decomposition to which the AS belongs. We will make use of
the robustness attacks presented in Section 5.2 (security attacks would
be inappropriate in this context, since security is obtained in other
ways, such as blocks random position explained above). Tests on l
First, we will focus on the decomposition level l using a fixed block
size D = 6 and the AWGN attack for illustrative purposes. Similar re-
Figure 4: Blocks selection process.
in the AS subband of the coefficients pertaining to each one of the N blocks and a set of N vectors
xi, 1 ≤ i ≤ N , each containing the wavelet coefficients in the i-th block. This information is also used
to construct the perceptual mask, as explained in the next Subsecti n III-C. The feature is evaluated on
the blocks by applying Equation 1, thus returning the original, unwatermarked feature vector k which
constitutes, together with the perceptual mask, the input to the QIM embedding algorithm.
C. Perceptual mask
In this Subsection, the construction of the perceptual mask (PM) is discussed. The perceptual mask allows
to control the watermark perceptibility. Since it is directly evaluated in the same wavelet domain which
the feature belongs to, the PM can be applied as a simple constraint in the watermark embedding process,
limiting the coefficients change during the watermark embedding.
The perceptual mask is actually calculated for every coeffi ient of the block coefficients vectors xi hence
PM is evaluated on the same structured set of blocks BK: a set of N masking vectors mi, 1 ≤ i ≤ N ,
that contain the perceptual mask values for each coefficient location in BK. However, for the sake of
simplicity, in the following we will evalua e PM n the entire AS subband.
The basis of our perceptual mask is directly derived from [8] and references therein, in which an
additive spread-spectrum detectable watermarking algorithm is applied to the first-level detail subbands
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of a wavelet decomposition. The algorithm is also applicable to the other subbands as well. There, the
masking effect is achieved by multiplying the pseudo-random binary sequence constituting the watermark
with a perceptual mask, which we call V . This was derived from previous work on the calculation
of optimal quantization step sizes for wavelet domain image compression. The perceptual mask V is
evaluated using all decomposition levels up to 4 and all of the subbands and represents the maximum
distortion that is perceptually tolerable on a coefficient-by-coefficient basis; that means that coefficients
corresponding to higher values of the perceptual mask are allowed to vary more to accommodate the
watermark without violating the imperceptibility requirement.
The originally proposed perceptual mask V is the product of 3 terms, as in:
V θd (r, c) = Θ(d, θ) · Λ(d, r, c) · Ξ(d, r, c)0.2 (4)
where (r, c) represents the row and column position in a given subband. The first term is a scalar value
Θ(d, θ) which depends on the particular considered subband, corresponding to decomposition level d
and orientation θ. The second term Λ(d, r, c) is derived from the luminance (that is the coefficient value
itself), following the principle that very dark and very bright regions of the image are less perceptually
sensitive to distortions than medium luminance ones. The last term Ξ(d, r, c) is an activity measure, since
the human eye is more tolerant to noise in textured areas of the image. It is calculated as the product of
the local mean square value of the detail subbands and the local variance in the approximation subband,
both evaluated in a local neighborhood of the considered coefficient, where the local neighborhood is
defined as unitary for the highest decomposition level and doubling in size as the level decreases.
Our perceptual mask is slightly different and is expressed as:
PM(r, c) = α · Λ(r, c) · Ξ(r, c)0.1 · Γ(r, c)−2 (5)
where (r, c) now represents the row and column position in the AS subband, which is the watermark
domain, so the d and θ indexes could be dropped. Since we always embed in the AS subband, the term
Θ is discarded; instead, we introduce a weight α as an overall strength factor. The log-luminance term
Λ(r, c) scans the AS subband. Given the variable, real-valued luminance range of the log-luminance image
I , as opposed to the standard luminance range [0, 255] found in LDR images, to properly identify dark
and bright areas of the image the following expression for Λ(r, c) is adopted, based on log-luminance
distribution percentiles:
Λ(r, c) =

1 if l ≤ l10 ∨ l > l90
1− 12 · l−l10l50−l10 if l > l10 ∧ l ≤ l50
1− 12 · l90−ll90−l50 if l > l50 ∧ l ≤ l90
(6)
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where l is the coefficient value in the position individuated by (r, c) in the AS subband (which is a
low-pass filtered version of the actual log-luminance value) and l10, l50 and l90 are the 10-percentile,
50-percentile and 90-percentile values respectively of the AS coefficients distribution. The term Λ(r, c),
therefore, assumes the value 1 for the extreme parts of the distribution and then decreases linearly towards
its median value where it assumes the value 0.5, in accordance with the luminance principle expressed
above.
The expression for the activity term Ξ, using Matlab notation for the sake of simplicity, is as follows:
Ξ(r, c) = V ar {AS(r − 1 : r + 1, c− 1 : c+ 1)} ·
Msv {DS2(r − 1 : r + 1, c− 1 : c+ 1); (7)
DS1(2r − 9 : 2r + 2, 2c− 9 : 2c+ 2)}
where V ar(·) and Msv(·) stand for variance and mean square value respectively. The local neighborhood
is enlarged to a 3×3 square centered on (r, c) in the AS; the position of the local area for other subbands
is derived from the decimation and filtering steps in the wavelet decomposition. The DS are considered
to compute the PM values since their coefficient values affects perceptibility of the reconstructed data.
The exponent for the activity term in Equation 5 is different from that in Equation 4 since in the
former an additional term Γ(r, c) has been introduced to take into account contour information. Among
the areas with high activity, individuated by the activity term, the ones characterized by a sharp contour
dividing two relatively flat areas are the less perceptually tolerant to noise. Therefore a dedicated term
is necessary to reduce the perceptual mask in their vicinity. To construct the term Γ(r, c), first we run a
Canny edge detector on the AS to extract the most significant edges. Then, starting from a binary map
(1 represents the edge points), we apply a moving average filter in a 7 coefficients sized neighborhood to
spread the edges. Then, the result γ(r, c) is transformed into the final value by: Γ(r, c) = 10γ(r,c). This
way, the coefficients without edges retain the multiplicative value 1 in Equation 5, while this value is
decreased exponentially as they get nearer the contours (recall the negative exponent of the term Γ(r, c)).
For illustrative purposes, Figure 5 provides an example of a perceptual mask and its constitutive parts;
all figures are rendered in a normalized gray scale version of the corresponding function, so that the gray
values are only representative of the relative strength and not of the absolute values of the various terms.
The original AS coefficients of the “Tree” HDR image and the closely associated Λ component, that
favors medium valued coefficients, are depicted in Figure 5a and 5b respectively; note how boundaries,
which present artifacts caused by the border symmetry condition in the wavelet transform, are neglected
in the perceptual mask computation. The activity term Ξ is reported in Figure 5c; note how the product
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of the log-luminance term and Ξ attains high values in the proximity of edges, as illustrated in Figure 5d
(edges visibility is reduced in Figure 5a due to the low-pass filtering). With the introduction of the
additional edge term Γ of Figure 5e (inverted to improve readability), the overall perceptual mask, which
is depicted in Figure 5f, is much less permissive around the edges and tends to reach its maximum
values in the textured, medium luminance areas of the image. Subsection IV-C shows how the various
components coordinate to achieve imperceptibility while retaining robustness.
D. Watermark embedding and detection
This Subsection briefly describes in turn the embedding process and the detector used in the watermark-
ing process of the reference log-luminance image. As already mentioned, the watermarking paradigm
employed in this work is the well-known QIM method, first presented in [7], in its detectable form. At
the detector side, we are only interested in assessing whether the watermark individuated by the secret
key K is present or not in the considered HDR image. Since our feature is 1-dimensional, that is to
say scalar, there is no need for vector quantization techniques thus leading to an efficient computational
implementation of the algorithm.
The watermark embedding consists of the quantization of the feature value using one of two possible
scalar quantizers, one shifted with respect to the other by ∆/2 (where ∆ is the quantization step in
the case of uniform quantizers). Each quantizer is identified by an embedding bit value, so if multiple
feature values are available in a feature vector it is possible to embed a watermark codeword by selecting
the appropriate quantizer for each feature vector component; the bit associated with every component
(or block as in our case) is embedded and decoded separately. In the case of detectable watermarking
scenario, the watermark payload is only 1 bit (the watermark presence itself), hence bit repetition is the
most effective coding for its transmission. We can assume without loss of generality that the quantizer
associated to value 1 is always used. Moreover, to enable security, QIM techniques generally rely on
shifting the codebook by a random quantity. In our case it is a scalar quantity d, whose application does
not affect either imperceptibility or robustness given that it is derived exclusively from the secret key
K and it is independent from the host feature value. Given a kurtosis feature value, the corresponding
watermarked feature value is expressed by:
h = Q∆(k − d∆) + d∆ (8)
where k is the original feature value, h is the quantized value, ∆ is the quantization step, Q∆(·) is the
quantization operator, with quantization step ∆ as parameter, and d is the codebook shift. The shift d is
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ORIG
(a) Original AS of the log luminance image I .
Lambda
(b) Luminance perception term: Λ.
Csi
(c) Activity perception term: Ξ.
Mask=Lambda*Csi
(d) The product Λ · Ξ.
Gamma
(e) Edges perception term: Γ.
Mask2=Lambda*Csi*Gamma
(f) The final perceptual mask: PM = Λ · Ξ · Γ.
Figure 5: The perceptual mask of the “Tree” figure and its product terms. Brighter values in (f) represent
less perceptible areas to changes in the kurtosis feature.
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extracted from a uniform distribution in [−1/2, 1/2] and then multiplied by ∆. Previous counter-shifting
of the original feature value is necessary to ensure that h is the nearest reconstruction point. Therefore,
the secret key K associates with each block a codebook shift uniformly distributed in the quantization
interval.
To decode the bit embedded in a block using the QIM paradigm, the received feature value k′ (which
is potentially different from h, e.g., due to attacks on the watermarked image) is re-quantized based on
a codebook that is the union of all possible embedding codebooks. The bit sequence associated with the
codebook to which the resulting reconstruction value belongs is the decoded string. In our case a single
bit is embedded in every block, by always employing only one of the two scalar quantizers shifted of
half quantization step one with respect to the other, so that it is simply necessary to evaluate whether
the reconstruction value h′ is associated or not to the quantizer corresponding to the bit value 1. From
another perspective, typical of the QIM detectable watermarking embedding process [7], the detection of
the bit embedded in every block consists in assessing whether the received feature k′ is within ∆/4 to
the closest reconstruction value of the sole quantizer associated with the bit value 1 (otherwise the bit
value 0 would be detected). Therefore, using again the notation presented above and in Equation 8, the
decoded bit b′ out of a single received block is recapped in the following pair of expressions:
h′ = Q∆(k′ − d∆) + d∆
b′ =
 1 if |k′ − h′| ≤ ∆/40 otherwise
(9)
In this work we do not use uniform quantization; instead, as we mentioned earlier, due to the fact
that the feature shows its robustness properties by bounding its relative (and non absolute) variation
following attacks on the image a non-uniform quantization with higher quantization steps as the feature
value increases is more appropriate in this context. The quantization scheme is illustrated in Figure 6,
where reconstruction values are identified by crosses and the circles stand for the reconstruction values
of the dual quantizer associated with the bit value 0, which is never used. For kurtosis values k < 15,
three quantization intervals Iq, q ∈ {1, 2, 3} are employed. Each interval hosts a single reconstruction
value, that is every interval is long exactly one corresponding quantization step; they are respectively
I1 = [1, 2] with ∆1 = 1, I2 = [2, 5] with ∆2 = 3 and I3 = [5, 15] with ∆3 = 10. For those rare
values beyond I3, namely k > 15, the quantization step ∆3 is used too. The case d = 0 in which the
codebook is not shifted is illustrated in Figure 6. If d 6= 0, the reconstruction values are no more in the
center of its corresponding quantization interval, as depicted in Figure 7 (observe how the quantization
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Figure 6: Quantization with d = 0.
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Figure 7: Quantizati n with d = −0.3.
intervals remain fixed). This in turn implies that a segment of length |d| ·∆q/2, corresponding to the part
associated to the dual reconstruction value (the circles), is included in any given quantization interval; if
the feature value belongs indeed to these segments, its corresponding reconstruction value would lie in
the adjacent quantization interval. Therefore, the quantization step associated to the latter interval is in
these cases adopted to minimize unavoidable decoding errors near the quantization interval boundaries;
in particular, with respect to Eq. 9, the correct decoding region when d < 0 is less than ∆q/4 for k′ < h
and when d > 0 is more than ∆q/4 for k′ > h. Such errors can be expected to be compensating each
other and concern only the less robust blocks anyway. The actual watermark embedding is performed
by applying an optimization algorithm to xi, 1 ≤ i ≤ N , the AS coefficients in each of the N blocks
contained in BK, in a way such that the corresponding watermarked coefficients vectors yi in WBK have
the quantized feature values vector h. The perceptual mask described in Subsection III-C is used as a
L∞-norm constraint in this process, in the sense that PM(r, c) acts as the upper bound of the absolute
admissible distortion of the AS coefficient in the position (r, c) for the watermark to be imperceptible.
The embedding procedure is described as follows: dropping as usual (r, c) and the block index, given a
coefficient vector x of length L and the associated PM vector m, we first define the coefficients subspace
Ω in <L (more precisely, in [1,∞]L) representing the region around the point x within the perceptual
mask:
Ω=
{
z ∈ [1,∞]L : |z− x| ≤m ∧ ‖z− x‖1≤τ ·‖m‖1
}
(10)
The L1 constraint is necessary to support the coefficient-by-coefficient based construction of the perceptual
mask, that is to say the PM is constructed neglecting the case where more than one adjacent coefficients
is changed at the same time. For this reason, the second inequality is introduced to avoid that too many
coefficients simultaneously experience their maximum variation in any given block; it is driven by the
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parameter τ which expresses the ratio of the sum of actual coefficient modifications with respect to
the maximum allowed, namely the L1-norm of m. The fine tuning of τ is an important design choice,
given that its value greatly influences not only the imperceptibility requirement satisfaction but also the
size of the subspace Ω and therefore the convergence of the embedding procedure, as described below.
Experimentally, a good value for τ is 0.3.
Hence, the mathematical procedure embodying the embedding process has to move the original feature
value to its quantized value, or at least as close as possible, while not moving y out of Ω:
y = arg min
z∈Ω
|k(z)− h| (11)
where the function k(·) is the kurtosis evaluation as in Equation 1. If this procedure converges to 0, then
k(y) = h as required. Notably, there could be many such solutions in the subspace Ω. This does not
matter as long as the individuated y satisfies both the PM constraints and the above condition on its
kurtosis.
There is a distinct probability that the procedure expressed by Equation 11 does not converge to 0. Less
likely is the non-convergence of the minimization process; in particular, this especially happens when
trying to change low kurtosis starting values k to distant h target values, which is a further justification
of the non-uniform, increasing step quantization adopted in this work. A much more likely possibility is
that the perceptual mask prevented the reaching of a suitable solution, namely the feature value can not
be quantized without introducing more distortion than allowed in the coefficient vector, which implies
that the perceptual constraints must not be stricter than necessary. In fact, when Equation 11 does not
converge, the kurtosis value of the watermarked vector is not h and this fact decreases the robustness of
the considered block against attacks since its feature value is closer than intended to the correct decoding
threshold. In extreme situations, it could be impossible to move the feature value out of the wrong
quantization interval, in this way triggering a decoding error even in the absence of attacks. Obviously,
it is imperative that not too many blocks experience this non-convergence situation because they hurt the
miss probability PM . The analysis on PM is carried out in Section IV.
Once the watermarked feature vectors yi, 1 ≤ i ≤ N , are obtained, the last step that the embedder
performs is the inverse wavelet transform of the log-luminance watermarked image Iw using both the
AS subband modified according to WBK and the detail subbands DS.
The watermark recovery block, that is the watermark detector, is depicted in Figure 3. Given a
potentially watermarked log-luminance image I ′w, it follows in the steps of the embedder, using the
secret key K, by extracting the received block information BK’, composed of attacked coefficients vectors
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y′i, 1 ≤ i ≤ N , and then by evaluating their kurtosis as in Equation 1, until a received feature vector k′
is obtained. Then, each block is decoded separately according to Equation 9. Last, a detection decision
is taken using a threshold T on the number of correctly decoded blocks (that is to say with decoded bit
value b′ = 1) out of the total number of embedding blocks N .
This detection structure allows to control in a simple way the probability of false alarm PFA as a
function T . In fact, if the image is unwatermarked, the received feature value is completely uncorrelated
with the reconstruction value associated to the bit 1, hence its probability of correct detection is 0.5 given
the uniform distribution of the shift d. Furthermore, since the blocks are non-overlapping, we can safely
assume that the blocks detection probabilities are independent one from the others. Given these premises,
the occurrence of a false alarm consists in the contemporaneous verification of at least T events with
probability p = 0.5 out of N . If we call E the latter event for a generic p, we have the following formula
based on the binomial distribution:
P (E) =
N∑
l=T
(
N
l
)
pl (1− p)N−l (12)
and then substituting p = 0.5 we obtain the false alarm probability as:
PFA =
N∑
l=T
(
N
l
)(
1
2
)l+N−l
=
(
1
2
)N N∑
l=T
(
N
l
)
(13)
which is easily computable and is used in Section IV to construct the ROC curves.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
This Section shows the effectiveness of the watermarking system while showing an example workflow
for the parameters setting and performance evaluation. First, to properly assess how the system performs
in terms of imperceptibility and detection, it is important to note that there is a number of variables
which affect the outcome, both external and internal (that is to say design parameters). The former ones
include the host HDR image, signifying both its content (and thus features) and size; the secret key K,
which drives all the pseudo-random steps in the algorithm and the tone-mapping operators (or any other
attack) considered for robustness requirements. Aside from those suitably fixed throughout Section III,
the design parameters that the system leaves free to vary at this point are: the PM overall strength factor
α (see Equation 5) and the blocks coverage percentage β (see Equation 3).
These parameters should be chosen to guarantee optimal performance depending on the external
variables; however, determining a good-for-all set of design parameter is not simple in this case. In
this work, we have operated as follows. First, in Subsection IV-B a single image is considered. Here,
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some experimental tests are run to evaluate both detection performance and imperceptibility, using a small
set of secret keys and of TM operators while varying the α and β parameters, to infer some guidelines
on how to choose the latter for any image by studying their behavior for the considered image. Then,
having fixed said design parameters (which are not the optimal ones for every image, every secret key and
every TM operator but represent a reasonable choice), in Subsection IV-C we conduct a brief evaluation
on the functionality of the perceptual mask and in Subsection IV-D we run the robustness tests on the
whole set of images and finally report the results for each TM operator. Subsection IV-E assesses the
robustness of the system to mask-driven noise addition. Finally, Subsection IV-F compares the system
to an hypothetical spread-spectrum system applied adopting the same experimental conditions and TM
processes. The experimental Subsections are preceded by Subsection IV-A, in which the HDR image
database and the set of tone-mapping operators considered has been described.
A. Experimental Conditions
The HDR image database used in our test is an heterogeneous set of 32 bit RGBe encoded images
collected from two sources: the Munsell Color Science Laboratory’s [9] and Greg Ward’s [10] website
repositories. The selection was performed so as to provide some variety in terms of subjects being
represented as well as image sizes and dynamic ranges. Table Ia reports the images list, complete with
the relevant data.
The tone-mapping operators considered in this work are those made available by the pfstmo library,
part of the pfstools package [18]; they are listed in Table Ib. Additionally, a tone-mapping algorithm
recently proposed by some of the authors of this work is also considered. Most of the algorithms need
some calibration efforts such as image-dependent parameter tuning and/or gamma correction to improve
the output tone-mapped image. Each image has undergone this process after it has been watermarked
(recall that the watermark is imperceptible); without discussing the details at length, the images have
been calibrated manually with the aim to provide the best possible result from a perceptual point of view
with reasonable effort, i.e., without exhaustive manipulation.
B. Design Parameters Tests
The well-known “Tree” image is selected as the benchmark image for these tests due to its varied visual
content, making it a challenging testbed.
First, imperceptibility is evaluated through the HDR-Visual Difference Predictor (HDR-VDP) tool [19],
which is a full-reference visual difference metric (meaning there is a so-called mask image to compare
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Image short name Source Size Notes
Apartment [10] 2048×1536 Natural, indoor
AtriumNight [10] 760×1016 Natural, indoor
Desk [10] 644×874 Natural, indoor
Montreal [10] 2048×1536 Natural, outdoor
Chair [9] 2000×1312 Natural, indoor
Atrium2 [9] 2000×1312 Natural, indoor
Fog [10] 751×1130 Natural, outdoor
Colorcube [9] 2000×1312 Natural, indoor
Dandelion [9] 1312×2000 Synthetic
DaniBelgium [10] 1024×768 Natural, indoor
Hallway [9] 2000×1312 Natural, indoor
Memorial [10] 512×768 Natural, indoor
Rend01 [10] 1024×1024 Synthetic
Splitcube [9] 2000×1312 Natural, outdoor
Tree [10] 928×906 Natural, outdoor
(a) List of the HDR images composing the test database.
Authors and year Abbreviation Reference
Mantiuk et al., 2008 M08 [11]
Reinhard et al., 2005 R05 [12]
Drago et al., 2003 D03 [13]
Fattal et al., 2002 F02 [14]
Pattanaik et al., 2000 P00 [15]
Durand et al., 2002 D02 [16]
Boschetti et al., 2010 B10 [17]
(b) List of the tone-mapping operators considered
throughout this work.
Table I: Database details.
a target image with). Given two similar images, the output of the HDR-VDP is the percentage of pixels
that, according to its model, a human observer would perceive as different with a given probability
(respectively 75% and 95%). In this context, it is used to evaluate the watermarked HDR image quality
with respect to the HDR original image in a way much more precise and tied to the HVS than purely
objective metrics like the PSNR.
In Table II it is reported a run with a random secret key. The factors α and β are allowed to vary
respectively in the sets {4, 6, 8, 10, 12} and {0.4, 0.45, 0.5, 0.55, 0.6, 0.65}. The number of extracted
blocks N is also reported for reference. The output of the HDR-VDP is expressed as the pixel percentages
at the 75% and 95% work points for all the combinations of the two design parameters. Obviously, the
perceptibility of the watermark increases with higher α (which means looser PM). However, this is not
always true column-wise, that is increasing the coverage percentage β. This counter-intuitive result is
due to the fact that changing β has been implemented as to lead to a complete re-extraction of the blocks
position, so that their “embeddability” properties vary from one coverage percentage to the next. This
was a design choice to increase security, since this way it is impossible to guess the position of some
blocks (and so possibly the secret key) by observing two watermarked images using different β but the
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α
β N HDR-VDP % 4 6 8 10 12
0.5 561
75 0.103 0.246 0.407 0.541 0.667
95 0.044 0.115 0.202 0.273 0.343
0.55 617
75 0.110 0.272 0.387 0.515 0.673
95 0.051 0.139 0.195 0.273 0.342
0.6 673
75 0.130 0.281 0.444 0.609 0.803
95 0.057 0.141 0.224 0.313 0.444
0.65 729
75 0.135 0.263 0.460 0.652 0.872
95 0.063 0.130 0.218 0.338 0.460
Table II: Imperceptibility test: relative frequency of perceived changes in terms of number of pixels,
expressed in percentage.
same key. Although in principle the same process could be applied with α, for which the blocks are not
re-extracted, this latter factor is not meant to be changed after its selection for a specific image, while
β is intended as the primary imperceptibility/robustness tradeoff parameter. If it is planned to securely
watermark the same image with both parameters variable (as in this demonstrative test), then the blocks
should be re-extracted for every (α, β) pair. However, though perhaps not monotonically for a given
secret key as in Table II, imperceptibility generally worsen with increasing β as it should be.
Next, decoding performance have to be taken into account to properly select the embedding parameters.
The watermarked images obtained through the previous run used to construct Table II are decoded both
as they are and after tone-mapping using the methods listed in Table Ib. The number of missed blocks
(not correctly decoded as in Equation 13) with respect to the total number of blocks N are shown in
Table III, which has the same setting as Table II. The third column represents T ∗, the complement of
the threshold T (T ∗ = N − T ), which is the maximum number of allowed missed blocks for an overall
watermark miss not to occur. The threshold T is calculated using Equation 13 so that PFA < 10−6.
The rows labeled “None” represent the decoding results of watermarked images without any specific TM
(clearly the decoding is still operating after the log-luminance transform) and so account for some of the
non-convergent blocks (those not correctly decoded) as explained in Subsection III-D. As foreseeable,
the amount of these blocks decreases as the PM is looser (that is with higher α); column-wise, the
percentage tends to remain invariant, with some variability induced by the secret key. Interestingly, the
latter variability is reflected in Table II (the difference being that in the latter there is an underlying linear
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β N T ∗ TM α = 4 α = 6 α = 8 α = 10 α = 12
0.5 561 224
None 129 102 88 84 79
M08 158 154 149 141 131
D03 195 201 205 198 194
R05 226 227 232 237 233
F02 241 240 241 238 242
P00 225 232 233 227 230
D02 242 235 234 227 227
B10 188 181 177 183 174
0.55 617 250
None 141 113 100 90 82
M08 189 170 163 157 156
D03 201 193 194 189 188
R05 245 240 244 251 256
F02 275 267 266 263 262
P00 234 228 226 231 230
D02 233 231 233 230 223
B10 219 208 206 197 205
0.6 673 274
None 165 134 119 111 101
M08 201 184 175 174 168
D03 233 227 229 229 222
R05 275 267 266 263 262
F02 300 290 294 299 292
P00 272 268 277 277 281
D02 280 278 271 272 277
B10 228 221 223 227 217
0.65 729 300
None 149 113 99 96 92
M08 218 190 182 175 164
D03 233 225 220 222 223
R05 296 286 280 281 281
F02 307 296 289 288 287
P00 275 268 268 267 265
D02 287 272 269 271 266
B10 245 243 236 238 232
Table III: Decoding test: number of missed blocks.
increase), suggesting that non-convergent blocks are also those that impact on perceptibility the most.
However, given that the secret key could not be chosen freely and that in blind watermarking systems
there is no side channel, it is impossible to avoid using these blocks in this framework. It has to be noted
that, as the number of blocks N increases along with the coverage factor β, the threshold accounts for
a higher percentage of incorrectly decoded blocks, as it is more and more difficult to get the number of
0.5-probability events biased away from half of the overall occurrences as the number of events increases.
23
Therefore, there is a distinct advantage in using more blocks from a decoding performance point of view,
although the monotonicity of this advantage is dependent on the secret key.
The other rows, labeled with the corresponding abbreviation, depict the decoding results after the
application of the considered TMs. As expected, more blocks are wrongly decoded; this results in
some overall misses (highlighted in bold), that in turn reflect the loss of the watermark. The (α, β)
combination for which a miss occur for any TM should be discarded, at least for this image, unless some
particular reason prevents it (e.g., unsatisfactory tone-mapped image visual quality due to algorithm
inappropriateness). It is notable that, as α increases, the number of incorrectly decoded blocks lowers
much less than its non-TM counterpart, suggesting that those blocks which converge to the correct
decoding interval only by loosing the PM are inherently less robust than the others. This reasoning
implies that, at similar HDR-VDP scores, it is more convenient from a robustness point of view to have
more and perceptually tighter blocks.
It is also possible to observe a sharp increment in decoding errors in the column α = 4. This indicates
the lower limit of the strength of the PM, as it hampers the convergence of too many blocks, including
those with good robustness and perceptibility properties (with α = 0 there would be no watermarking
process).
In conclusion, the best watermarking strategy would be to choose the perceptual mask strength factor
α to let imperceptibility and robustness lie in a suitable interval and then tuning the coverage factor β
according to the robustness-imperceptibility trade-off as required. Decoding performance, however, are
bound to improve as the size of the image increases, both because of the higher number of blocks used
for watermarking purposes and of the higher quality of the watermarked images.
By inspection of Table III, a reasonable parameter choice would be α = 8 and β = 0.65, which
does not show misses and is still very good in terms of perception. Following our previous discussion,
this choice maximizes the number of blocks while not widening excessively the perceptual mask. This
combination is therefore adopted for the remainder of the tests.
C. Perceptual mask components evaluation
Table IV proves the importance of each of the components of the mask for achieving high imperceptibility,
while at the same time ensuring sufficient robustness. In this test, the “Tree” image has been watermarked
with the same secret key as before, but using only some of the mask components in turn and normalizing
the mask energy with the α parameter so that all the alternative masks have the same energy as the
proposed one (note that it does not imply that the watermark will have the same energy). The HDR-VDP
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Components
HDR-VDP % TM
DWRdB
75 95 None M08
Λ 0.123 0.047 171 208 34.8
Ξ 1.730 1.045 20 99 22.4
Λ · Ξ 1.373 0.820 24 105 22.8
Λ · Ξ · Γ 0.460 0.218 99 182 32.2
Table IV: Perceptual mask components performance.
is reported together with the Data-to-Watermark Ratio (DWR), expressed in dB, in the logL domain.
To assess robustness, the number of decoding errors is also reported, for the cases of no additional
manipulation and the M08 tone-mapping algorithm.
As it can be seen, using only the luminance component Λ achieves high imperceptibility, but this is
because the total watermark energy, expressed by the DWR, is quite low; this also causes an appreciable
loss in robustness. On the other hand, using only the activity component Ξ shows how the watermark is
robust when it is preferably embedded in areas of the image with high variance, but also how perceptible
it is, since high activity, either dark or bright areas of the image are heavily modified. Combining the edge
component Γ with the activity component helps to improve the perceptibility issue without impacting
too much on the system robustness performance, showing that dealing specifically with sharp contours
is advisable. Joining the three components as proposed is a satisfying tradeoff between the high degree
of imperceptibility necessary for high quality HDR images and the requested robustness.
D. Robustness against tone-mapping
Tables V and VI report the decoding results with this parameter combination, for large and small images
respectively; the results for the “Tree” image are repeated here for comparison. As it can be seen, the total
number of decoding errors is always lower than T ∗, so that none of the images results in a miss (except
in a pair of cases, where proper image post-tone-mapping calibration was not satisfactory). Therefore,
the watermark proves to be widely robust to tone-mapping operators as expected. With such a small set
of images it is impossible to draw ROC curves based on actual misses and false alarms. To approximate
them, we have evaluated the sample mean of the block decoding error probability pe for each of the
tone-mapping algorithms. Then, the miss probability PM is estimated as follows:
PM = 1−
N∑
l=T
(
N
l
)
(1− pe)l pN−le (14)
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Apartment Montreal Chair Atrium2 Colorcube Dandelion Hallway Splitcube
N 3106 3106 2567 2567 2567 2567 2567 2567
T 1686 1686 1404 1404 1404 1404 1404 1404
T ∗ 1420 1420 1163 1163 1163 1163 1163 1163
TMO

None
M08
D03
R05
F02
P00
D02
B10
518 882 611 508 544 811 567 474
652 957 731 587 599 824 597 541
734 936 779 579 599 811 588 528
951 1000 696 588 653 840 600 551
1278 1106 910 843 994 856 920 811
803 1009 711 703 717 820 601 603
1131 931 779 667 818 869 594 630
1017 950 1030 666 895 1219 761 677
Table V: Decoding test for the largest images: number of missed blocks.
AtriumNight Desk Fog DaniBelgium Memorial Rend01 Tree
N 666 457 737 666 298 938 729
T 394 279 433 394 190 542 429
T ∗ 272 178 304 272 108 396 300
TMO

None
M08
D03
R05
F02
P00
D02
B10
102 119 101 175 64 231 129
161 151 144 195 96 259 182
130 149 127 201 81 245 220
142 189 118 223 98 257 280
256 176 279 263 97 341 289
182 168 173 212 103 269 268
204 163 203 224 98 332 269
154 171 195 239 98 295 243
Table VI: Decoding test for the smallest images: the number of missed blocks.
The ROC for 4 values of the number of blocks N are reported in Figure 8. Although the results are
already satisfactory for smaller images, they are excellent for larger images. It has to be noted that
the number of block decoding errors in a given image is strongly dependent on how good is the tone-
mapping algorithm for the specific image (as the misses in Tables V and VI demonstrate). There are
other factors of variability, as already stated at the beginning of this Section, embodied by the image
itself and the secret key. However, the fluctuation around the mean error probability given by these two
parameters are negligible when the tone-mapping result possesses sufficient visual quality; hence, the low
26
10−10 10−5 100
10−10
10−9
10−8
10−7
10−6
10−5
10−4
10−3
10−2
10−1
100
ROC for N=298
PFA
P M
 
 None
M08
D02
D03
R05
F02
P00
B10
10−10 10−5 100
10−10
10−9
10−8
10−7
10−6
10−5
10−4
10−3
10−2
10−1
100
ROC for N=457
PFA
P M
 
 None
M08
D02
D03
R05
F02
P00
B10
10−20 10−15 10−10 10−5 100
10−14
10−12
10−10
10−8
10−6
10−4
10−2
100
ROC for N=729
PFA
P M
 
 None
M08
D02
D03
R05
F02
P00
B10
10−30 10−25 10−20 10−15 10−10
10−14
10−12
10−10
10−8
10−6
10−4
10−2
100
ROC for N=2567
PFA
P M
 
 F02
B10
Figure 8: Estimated ROC for each of the TMOs, plotted for various values of the number of blocks N .
block decoding error probability obtained in these cases guarantees the excellent performance shown in
Figure 8, especially for larger images.
E. Robustness against noise addition
Next, we also consider robustness against a more basic manipulation: noise addition. To comply with the
high quality imagery paradigm of this work, noise addition is performed in such a way that its power is
maximized while guaranteeing that its perceptibility remains low. To this aim, the perceptual mask is used
and the noise is added directly in the embedding wavelet domain. First, a pseudo-random noise matrix
with uniform, zero-centered distribution is extracted. The noise is 2-D low-pass filtered to increase its
27
145 150 155 160 165 170 175 180 1850
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
HDR−VDP 1x
Block decoding errors
(a) Histogram for the “Tree” image.
Image PM DNRdB
Apartment < 10−14 28.3
Montreal < 10−14 38.2
Chair < 10−14 27.8
Atrium2 < 10−14 31.1
Colorcube < 10−14 31.3
Dandelion < 10−14 43.9
Hallway < 10−14 43.8
Splitcube < 10−14 35.6
AtriumNight < 10−14 38.5
Desk 7 · 10−14 30.5
Fog < 10−14 34.9
DaniBelgium 6 · 10−12 33.4
Memorial < 10−14 31.4
Rend01 4 · 10−11 35.7
Tree < 10−14 31.1
(b) PM and mean DNR for all the images.
Figure 9: Robustness against mask-driven noise addition.
correlation and also locally scaled so as to evenly distribute its energy in the approximation coefficients
subband. Then, the resulting pattern is multiplied by the perceptual mask and by a global strength factor;
finally, it is added to the corresponding watermarked subband.
The results of this test are shown in Figure 9. The global strength parameter is manually set for each
watermarked image such that the perceptual distortion in terms of HDR-VDP is about the same as that
introduced by the watermarking process itself with respect to the original images. Each image underwent
1000 noise additions; the noise obviously causes more blocks to be incorrectly decoded. The histogram of
the number of incorrectly decoded blocks is reported in Figure 9a for the “Tree” image as an example. To
estimate the miss probability PM , one could approximate the histogram with a normal distribution, thus
computing its mean and variance, and then calculating the area of the distribution that goes beyond the
threshold, fixed by PFA < 10−6, using the complementary error function. Table 9b shows such estimated
PM , along with the mean Data-to-Noise Ratio (DNR) of the noise attack for that image, expressed in
dB. Both the DNR and PM largely depend on the structure of the image through the mask. However,
given the usually high noise energy, the worst miss probability is still quite satisfying, considering also
the fact that the system is optimized for the “Tree” image.
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F. Comparison with spread-spectrum watermarking
Last, we have run a comparison test using spread-spectrum watermarking, the other major paradigm in
digital watermarking (see [1]). The test is confined to the “Tree” image and the embedding is performed
in the same wavelet domain as the proposed method employing the algorithm discussed in [8]. The
proposed log-luminance transform step is still applied to convert the originally LDR based algorithm to
the HDR domain.
Since now the watermark is embedded in all of the AS subband, the column feature vector x indicates
all of the coefficients. After having generated the watermark vector zK , which is extracted using the
secret key K (in this case the watermark is a pseudo-random sequence composed of +1 and -1 of the
same size of x), the watermarked subband is:
y = x + γ · zK ·w (15)
where γ is a strength parameter, which as before is set such that the perceptual quality of the watermarked
image is about the same as that obtained with our method, and w is the masking sequence obtained as
in [8]. The watermark detection is correlation-based; given a received image, its embedding subband y′
is extracted and the correlation is computed as:
ρK =
zTKy
′
V
(16)
where V is the size of the vectors. Then the correlation is checked against a threshold Tss to assess the
watermark presence. How the threshold is set depends on the system: for example, in [8] it is theoretically
set according to the Neyman-Pearson criterion and by exploiting the expected normal distributions of the
correlation under all the decoding hypothesis and some independence assumptions.
In this work, the Neyman-Pearson criterion is still used but an experimental framework is adopted
instead. Given a “Tree” image watermarked with the secret key K and then tone-mapped using a given
operator, the correlation ρK′ with a high number of extraneous watermarks (that is generated by different
secret keys) is computed: an example histogram is plotted as the solid line in Figure 10a. As expected, a
zero-mean normal distribution is obtained. By estimating its standard deviation, one could fix Tss such
that PFA = p(ρK′ > Tss). Then, 1000 other watermarked images using different keys are generated and
subsequently tone-mapped. Eq. 16 is finally applied to compute the correlations of the latter images, using
consistent keys, to obtain the correlation values in case of detection with matching keys. The histogram of
these values are plotted as the dotted line in Figure 10a which report the D03 TM case; as expected again,
it is a non zero-mean normal distribution. By estimating the standard deviation of the latter distribution, it
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Figure 10: Comparison with spread-spectrum watermarking.
is possible to compute a projected miss probability PM by evaluating the probability that the correlation
value is less than Tss, using the standard complementary error function. Figure 10b depicts the ROC
curves for such estimations. Remarkably, all TM perform similarly in the spread-spectrum context; for
this reason, only the worst and best cases are reported (D03 and M08 respectively). As it can be observed
by comparison with Figure 8, the results of spread-spectrum watermarking applied in the same conditions
as our method are considerably worse than those reported in Figure 8.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we presented an algorithm for a HDR image detectable watermarking system with the
requirements of imperceptibility and robustness against tone-mapping operators as well as security. A
previously developed watermarking system for grayscale LDR images has been employed in the LogLuv
domain.
Experimental results have proven to be very good, especially considering how the design parameters
have been set on a single image and then employed for the entire dataset. Automatic ways of setting these
parameters will in fact be considered in our future work. The watermarks embedded using our system
have always been detected, with the exception of the cases where the tone-mapping algorithms have given
visually unsatisfactory output images. The system has also been compared to a basic spread-spectrum
watermarking algorithm operating in the same domain.
As a final note, it could be interesting to switch to non-blind watermarking, which will probably be
30
another likely applicative scenario for HDR image watermarking. This would allow to choose which
blocks to use for embedding, avoiding those difficult to watermark; to this aim, an extensive study of
feature variability could be of great aid in determining in which zone of the image the watermarking
system is more effective.
REFERENCES
[1] I.Cox, M. Miller, and J. Bloom, Digital Watermarking. Morgan Kaufman, 2001.
[2] M. Barni and F. Bartolini, Watermarking Systems Engineering: Enabling Digital Assets Security and Other Applications.
CRC Press, 2004.
[3] F. Guerrini, R. Leonardi, and M. Barni, “Image watermarking robust to non-linear value-metric scaling based on higher
order statistics,” in Int. Conf. on Acoustics, Speech and Signal Processing (ICASSP), Toulouse, France, May 2006.
[4] G. W. Larson, “Logluv encoding for full-gamut, high-dynamic range images,” Journal of Graphics Tools, vol. 3, no. 1,
pp. 15–31, 1998.
[5] R. Mantiuk and H.-P. Seidel, “Modeling a generic tone-mapping operator,” Graphics Forum (Proc. of EUROGRAPHICS),
vol. 27, no. 2, pp. 699–708, 2008.
[6] F. Guerrini, “Digital image watermarking robust against non-linear attacks,” Ph.D. dissertation, University of Brescia, 2008.
[7] B. Chen and G. Wornell, “Quantization index modulation: A class of provably good methods for digital watermarking and
information embedding,” IEEE Trans. on Information Theory, vol. 47, no. 4, pp. 1423–1443, 2001.
[8] M. Barni, F. Bartolini, and A. Piva, “Improved wavelet-based watermarking through pixel-wise masking,” IEEE Trans. on
Image Processing, vol. 10, no. 5, pp. 783–791, 2001.
[9] Munsell Color Science Laboratory Database. [Online]. Available: http://www.cis.rit.edu/mcsl/icam/hdr/rit hdr
[10] Anyhere Software Database. [Online]. Available: http://www.anyhere.com/gward/hdrenc/pages/originals.html
[11] R. Mantiuk, S. Daly, and L. Kerofsky, “Display adaptive tone mapping,” ACM Trans. on Graphics, vol. 27, no. 3, 2008.
[12] E. Reinhard and K. Devlin, “Dynamic range reduction inspired by photoreceptor physiology,” IEEE Trans. on Visualization
and Computer Graphics, vol. 11, pp. 13–24, 2005.
[13] F. Drago, K. Myszkowski, T. Annen, and N. Chiba, “Adaptive logarithmic mapping for displaying high contrast scenes,”
Eurographics, 2003.
[14] R. Fattal, D. Lischinski, and M. Werman, “Gradient domain high dynamic range compression,” ACM Trans. on Graphics,
2002.
[15] S. Pattanaik, J. Tumblin, H. Yee, and D. Greenberg, “Time-dependent visual adaptation for fast realistic image display,”
Proc. of ACM SIGGRAPH, 2000.
[16] F. Durand and J. Dorsey, “Fast bilateral filtering for the display of high-dynamic-range images,” ACM Trans. on Graphics,
2002.
[17] A. Boschetti, N. Adami, R. Leonardi, and M. Okuda, “High dynamic range image tone mapping based on local histogram
equalization,” in Proc. IEEE Int. Conf. on Multimedia and Expo (ICME), Singapore, Singapore, July 2010.
[18] Pfstools website. [Online]. Available: http://pfstools.sourceforge.net/
[19] K. Myszkowski, R. Mantiuk, and H.-P. Seidel, “Visible difference predictor for high dynamic range images,” Int. Conf. on
Systems, Man and Cybernetics, pp. 2763–2769, 2004.
